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THE RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS
J. Coy BouR*
The Missouri Annotations to the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws
were published in 1937.1 The introduction to these Annotations reads in
part as follows: "In the preparation of this volume the annotator carried
his study of statutes and cases down to the close of Vol. 334 of the Missouri
Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 228 of the Missouri Appeal Reports and Vol.
70 (2d) of the South Western Reporter." It seemed desirable, in order to
present a complete picture of the local law in the field, to publish a summary
of the Missouri decisions which have appeared in subsequent volumes of the
reports. This paper is an attempt to present such a summary. The material
presented covers the Missouri decisions which have appeared in volumes
71(2d)-111(2d) of the South Western Reporter. Parallel citations of the
official reports are given, so far as these had appeared at the date of going to
press. The writer has indicated whether the rule enunciated by the
Restatement accords with the position of the local authorities, but no at-
tempt has been made to present a detailed discussion of the problems ap-
pearing in the decisions.
The purpose of state annotations is to increase the usefulness of the
Restatements prepared by the American Law Institute. The aim of this
paper is to make the Missouri Annotations to the Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws of maximum usefulness to the practitioner, to enable him to
get as quickly as possible at the current law of Missouri. But a word of
warning must here be entered. The decisions in this field are not grouped
under a single heading in any of the books of reference. One must find
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B., 1917, LL:B., 1920, Uni-
versity of Missouri; S.J.D., 1925, Harvard. Author, with James L. Parks, of the
MissouRi ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937).
1. For economy of space THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), will be referred to merely as RESTATEMENT. The
MissouRi ANNOTATIONS to this Restatement will be cited as Mo. ANNOT.
(143)
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his material by a search in scores of digest headings, and it may well be
that some cases have been missed. It is hoped, however, that the profes-
sion will find, in this paper and the Missouri Annotations combined, an
adequate guide to the present state of the local law in this field.
I. Domitm
A. Change of Domicil
A person who has attained his majority and is not under some legal
disability may change his domieil.2 The Missouri cases hold that actual
residence and the intention to remain either permanently or for an indefi-
nite time, without any fixed or certain purpose to return to the former resi-
dence, will constitute a change of domicil.3 The motive with which a
change of residence is made is immaterial, but it may be important evi-
dence tending to show the nature of the intent.4 Thus a recent case holds
that removal for educational purposes may be consistent with either change
or continuance of domicil. In Chomeau v. Roth,' the contestant in disput-
ing a city election alleged that some 219 votes had been illegally cast by stu-
dents of Concordia Seminary, a Lutheran theological school. It was shown
that the students upon entering the school for the three-year course and
a possible post-graduate course did not intend to return to their parents'
homes but were subject to call to one of the Lutheran congregations or mis-
sions in any part of the world. The contestant appealed from a judgment
for the contestee. In affirming the judgment the court said: "As they
(two earlier decisions) announce the law, it is entirely possible for a stu-
dent to gain a residence at the place where he is attending school, although
he may have gone there for no other purpose than to attend school; the
question of whether a change of residence is effected depending upon the
intention with which the removal from the former residence was made. A
temporary removal for the sole purpose of attending school, without any
intention of abandoning his usual residence, and with the fixed intention
of returning thereto when his purpose has been accomplished, will not con-
stitute such a change of residence as to entitle the student to vote at his
temporary abode. But conversely, an actual residence, coupled with the
2. See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 15.1 et seq.; RESTATEMENT
§ 15.
3. See Mo. ANNOT. §§ 15-20.
4. See RESTATEMENT § 22; Mo. ANNOT. § 22.
5. 230 Mo. App. 709, 72 S. W. (2d) 997 (1934).
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intention to remain either permanently or for an indefinite time, without
any fixed or certain purpose to return to the former place of abode, is suffi-
cient to work a change of domicil. ' ' This decision is in accord with the
Restatement.7
II. JURISDICTION OF COURTS
A. Jurisdiction over Persons
Notice and Opportunity to be Heard. Section 75 of the Restatement
reads as follows: "A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jur-
isdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the
state, unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably cal-
culated to give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and
an opportunity to be heard." There can be no doubt in this country that
this requirement is made obligatory by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Thus a re-
cent Missouri case holds that in a suit on a judgment of another state the
defendant may plead and show as a defense that in the original suit no
service was had upon him
Appearance. Section 82 of the Restatement says: "An appearance
by a defendant in an action gives the court jurisdiction over him for all
purpose of the action if by the law of the state in which the action is
brought the appearance has that effect." The Missouri decisions are in
accord with the Restatement. Missouri follows the rule that an appear-
ance entered by a defendant solely for the purpose of objecting that the
court has no jurisdiction over his person does not subject him to the juris-
diction of the court. On the other hand, an appearance by a defendant
for a purpose other than to object that the court has no jurisdiction over
him subjects him to the jurisdiction of the court. 0
If lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant appears on
the face of the record, the objection should be raised by motion and not by
answer." Thus if the objection is to the sufficiency of the return, it should
6. 230 Mo. App. at p. 718, 72 S. W. (2d) at p. 999.
7. See RESTATEMENT §§ 18, 22; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 18, 22.
8. See Mo. ANNOT. § 75.
9. Topalian Bros. v. Asadorian, 104 S. W. (2d) 713 (Mo. App. 1937). See
notes 111 and 113, infra.
10. See Mo. ANNOT. § 82.
11. A Missouri statute (Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 770) makes lack of
jurisdiction of either persons or subject matter ground for demurrer if the facts
3
Bour: Bour: Recent Missouri Decisions and The Restatement
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1938
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
be raised by motion to quash the return. If the objection is to the substance
of the summons, it should be raised by motion to quash the summons.1 2 A
recent case holds that if the defendant appears specially and moves to quash
the summons and the motion is wrongly overruled and he then pleads to the
merits, he waives the objection and cannot take advantage of the lack of
jurisdiction over him. He cannot preserve the objection by including it
in his answer."3 On the other hand, when the jurisdictional defect does not
appear on the face of the record, but a showing of new facts is necessary
to establish it, an answer is the proper remedy. 4 In such a case the defend-
ant may plead to the jurisdiction of the court over his person in the same
answer in which he makes his defense on the merits; both defenses must
be tried and neither is waived by the other. 5 This statement is supported
by a recent decision.'" The writer has discussed the earlier cases else-
where.'
B. Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
I. Consent
In Section 91 of the Restatement it is stated that where a foreign cor-
poration voluntarily appoints an agent or a public official in a state to ac-
cept service of process in actions brought against the corporation in that
state, jurisdiction exists because of consent. By way of explanation, com-
ment c of Section 91 says: "If a corporation has appointed an agent or a
public official in a state with authority to accept service of process in ac-
tions brought against the corporation in that state, the extent of that au-
thority is a question of interpretation of the instrument in which the con-
sent is expressed and of the statute, if any, in pursuance of which the con-
sent was given. The authority may be interpreted to extend to all causes
of action, no matter where arising, brought against the corporation in the
showing it appear on the face of the petition. Since ordinarily jurisdiction of
the person is not a matter to be alleged in the petition but is acquired by service
of process or consent of the defendant, it is unusual for lack of jurisdiction over
the person to appear on the face of the petition. Cf. State ex rel. Utilities P. &
L. Corp. v. Ryan, 337 Mo. 1180, 88 S. W. (2d) 157 (1935).
12. See Mo. ANNOT. § 82.
13. Klohr v. Edwards, 94 S. W. (2d) 99 (Mo. App. 1936).
14. See Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) §§ 774, 776.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. Detmer, Bruner & Mason v. New York Cent. R. R., 229 Mo. App. 702,
80 S. W. (2d) 222 (1935) (defendant a foreign corporation).
17. See note 12, supra; Bour, Special Appearance-Waiver by Pleading
Over (1928) 40 U. oF Mo. BuLL. LAW SEP. 34.
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state, or it may be limited to causes of action arising within the state; it
may be revocable at any time, or it may be irrevocable as to causes of ac-
tion arising within the state prior to an attempt to revoke it." The law
of Missouri is in accord with the Restatement.l
1
In the Missouri Annotations, the writer referred to Section 4598 of
the Revised Statutes of Missouri. This section was a part of the act relat-
ing to the admission of foreign corporations to do business in the state.' 9
It required such corporations to appoint an agent in the state to accept
service of process in actions brought against the corporation in the state.
In 1937 this section was repealed and a new section enacted in lieu there-
of.2 0 Although the new section is identical with the old one in many re-
speets, it contains certain provisions which did not appear in the old sec-
tion. The statutes now provide that every foreign corporation doing busi-
ness in Missouri shall maintain a public office in the state "where legal
service may be obtained upon it;" 2 ' and that the principal officer or agent
in Missouri shall make and forward to the Secretary of State a sworn state-
ment, "which statement shall set out the location of its principal office or
place in this state for the transaction of business, the name of its princi-
pal agent in Missouri and the address where legal service may be obtained
upon it by serving such agent, and also set out that if service cannot be had
upon such agent on account of absence, death or inability of serving offi-
cer to find such agent that service may be had upon the Secretary of State
which shall be binding upon the corporation. A non est return of the serv-
ing officer shall be taken as prima facie evidence that the principal agent
cannot be found. The Secretary of State shall upon the service of such
process forward the same by registered mail to the home office of the cor-
poration. 122 These provisions do not apply to foreign insurance corpora-
tions licensed by the Superintendent of Insurance in this state. It is to
be noted that the authority of the agent or state official to accept service
of process is not expressly limited to causes of action arising out of -busi-
18. See Mo. ANNOT. § 91. Numerous articles dealing with jurisdiction over
foreign corporations are available. See Culp, Constitutional Problems Arisingfrom Service of Process on Foreign Corporations (1935) 19 MINN. L. REY. 375;
Farrier, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1933) 17 MINN. L. REV. 270;
Scott, Jurisdition Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 563;
Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 MiCH. L. Ray. 633;
Osborne, Arising Out of Business in the State (1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 380.
19. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) §§ 4596-4598, 4600.
20. Mo. Laws 1937, p. 206.
21. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) §§ 4596-7.
22. See note 20, supra.
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ness done within the state. No Missouri case involving this point has been
found.
The statute (Section 5894)23 relating to foreign insurance corpora-
tions provides that any such corporation, desiring to transact business in
this state, shall appoint the Superintendent of Insurance its agent to ac-
cept service of process in actions brought against the corporation in the
state; and that service of process upon the Superintendent of Insurance
shall be valid and binding on the corporation "so long as it shall have any
policies or liabilities outstanding in this state, although such company may
have withdrawn, been excluded from or ceased to do business in this state."
The statute relating to foreign fraternal benefit corporations contains sim-
ilar provisions.24
Several recent cases involve the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
insurance corporations licensed to do business in Missouri. It seems de-
sirable to refer to the earlier cases cited in the Missouri Annotations5 be-
fore discussing the more recent cases. In State ex rel. Pacffic Mutuol Life
Ins. Co. v. Grimm 2G the plaintiff, a non-resident, brought suit against a
California corporation licensed to do business in Missouri, upon a policy
of insurance issued and delivered to the insured in Illinois. The summons
was served upon the Superintendent of Insurance. In Gold Issue Min-
ing & Miling Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co.,27 the suit was by an Ari-
zona corporation against a Pennsylvania corporation licensed to do busi-
ness in Missouri, upon a fire insurance policy issued and delivered in Colo-
rado. The summons was served upon the Superintendent of Insurance.
In both of these cases the defendant had appointed the state official its
agent to accept service of process; and in both cases the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the authority of the state official to accept service of pro-
cess extended to the cause of action which arose out of business done in
another state. The decision in the second case was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.2" But these Missouri decisions have
been limited by a later decision.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929). Id. § 5895, authorizes service upon the chief
clerk in the absence of the superintendent and deputy superintendent.24. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 6006, 6007. See State ex rel. Modern Wood-
men of America v. Wilcox, infra note 30.
25. See Mo. ANNOT. § 91.
26. 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (1912).
27. 267 Mo. 524, 184 S. W. 999 (1916).
28. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U. S. 93 (1917).
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In State ex rel. American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr, 9 a
foreign insurance corporation, licensed to do business in Missouri, issued
a life-insurance policy to a resident of Kansas, who applied for and accept-
ed the policy in Kansas and resided there at the time of his death. The
beneficiary was a resident of Kansas at the time the policy was issued and
at the time the beneficiary brought suit in Missouri. The summons was
served upon the Superintendent of Insurance. The Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the cor-
poration. The supreme court said that the decision "necessarily results
in overruling the Grimm and Gold Issue Mining & Milling Company Cases,
in so far as those cases deal with the question now before us .... ','o
In a recent case, State ex rel. Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Masterson,31 the
suit was brought by the insured, a resident of Missouri, upon a policy of
insurance issued in Kansas, and the summons was served upon the Super-
intendent of insurance in this state is valid service and gives to the court
tensed to do business in Missouri at the time of suit. The Kansas City
Court of Appeals held that the Missouri court acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant, notwithstanding, at the time the policy was issued, the in-
sured was a resident of Kansas and the defendant was not licensed to do
business in Missouri. The Landwehr case was distinguished on the ground
that the plaintiff in that case was a ron-resident at the time of suit, where-
as the plaintiff in the Masterson case was a resident at the time of suit. The
Court said: "We conclude that the courts of Missouri are vested with ju-
risdiction to hear and determine questions arising on insurance contracts,
contracted in or ont of the state of Missouri, if suit is brought by a citizen
of this state against an insurance company authorized to do business in this
state. We conclude further that in such an instance service of the super-
intendent of insurance in this state is valid service and gives to the court
out of which process was issued jurisdiction, in such a suit, of the insurance
company so served.''3" (Italics supplied).
29. 318 Mo. 181, 300 S. W. 294 (1927).
30. 318 Mo. at p. 191, 300 S. W. (2d) at p. 298. See Burg v. Knox, 334
Mo. 329, 336, 67 S. W. (2d) 96, 99 (1933), where the court said: "This Court
en Bane in State ex rel. v. Landwehr, . . . overruled its former opinion
in the Grimm case on the question of the validity of service of summons on the
Insurance Commissioner in an action against a foreign insurance company upon
a policy written in another state." Cf. State ex rel. Modern Woodmen of America
v. Wilcox, 229 Mo. App. 988, 84 S. W. (2d) 678 (1935), involving the statute
providing for service of process upon the Superintendent of Insurance in actions
against foreign fraternal benefit corporations. See note 24, supra.
31. 95 S. W. (2d) 864 (Mo. App. 1936).
32. 95 S. W. (2d) at p. 865. Cf. Crabtree v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 111 S. W.
7
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In two recent cases, London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woefe 3
and Saunders v. London Assurance Corp.,3" the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusions as to the law of Mis-
souri. In the last mentioned case the court said: "Examination of all of the
opinions of the Supreme Court of Missouri construing this section of the
statute and dealing with this question will disclose that nowhere has the
right of a citizen of the state to resort to its own courts in such cases been
denied or questioned . . . ."35 (Italics supplied).
One recent case involved the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign in-
surance corporation which had once done but had ceased to do business in
Missouri. 36 In State ex rel. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Wright,3 7 the
defendant, a foreign insurance corporation, had been licensed to do busi-
ness in Missouri. The plaintiff brought suit for specific performance of a
realty contract after the corporation had ceased to do business and after
the expiration of its license, although at the time of suit the defendant still
had policies outstanding in Missouri. The summons was served upon the
Superintendent of Insurance. The Kansas City Court of Appeals said
that in a suit based on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, sum-
mons could doubtless be served upon the state official even though the de-
fendant's license had expired. But the court pointed out that the case un-
der consideration did not involve any policy of insurance and did not grow
out of any insurance contract. It was held, therefore, that service on the
state official did not confer jurisdiction over the corporation.
2. Doing Business
In the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws it is stated that a state can-
not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has neither con-
sented to the exercise of jurisdiction nor done business within the state,
unless the corporation has by entering an appearance or by bringing an
action subjected itself to the exercise of jurisdiction." This familiar prin-
(2d) 103, 108 (Mo. 1937), where the court said that "section 5894 does not au-
thorize service thereunder on causes of action accruing in and instituted by
citizens of another state on policies issued or business transacted in foreign states,
State ex rel. Amer. Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Landwehr .... " (Italics supplied).
33. 83 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
34. 76 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
35. 76 F. (2d) at p. 929.
36. See RESTATnMENT § 91, comment c. Cf. RESTATEMENT § 93; Mo.
ANNOT. § 93.
37. 88 S. W. (2d) 427 (Mo. App. 1935).
38. See RESTATEMBNT §§ 89, 92; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 89, 92.
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ciple is protected by two provisions of the Federal Constitution. 9 In the
absence of consent, state statutes providing for suits against and service of
process upon foreign corporations can constitutionally apply only to cor-
porations "doing business" within the state.40  Courts generally have not
attempted to formulate any definition of what constitutes "doing business".
Each case has to be considered upon its own facts. 1 The concept of "do-
ing business" for purposes of service of process was considered in two re-
cent Missouri cases. Both cases hold that a foreign railroad corporation
maintaining a soliciting agent in Missouri but operating no lines in the
state is not "doing business" and hence personal service of summons on
the soliciting agent is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion.4 2 These decisions are in accord with the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Since the question when a foreign corpora-
tion is "doing business" in a state is a federal question, the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States are binding on the states.
3. Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate
Commerce.
The exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations is subject not
only to the limitations imposed by the due process requirement, but also
to the prohibition of undue burdens upon interstate commerce under the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.43 In Meek v. New York,
Chicago & St. Louis R. R.,44 an action for the death of a switchman under
the Federal Safety Appliance Act, the defendant railroad contended that
the Missouri court "had no jurisdiction of this cause for the reason that
Meek was killed in Indiana; that all of the witnesses in the cause reside
39. AMEND. XIV § 1 (due process clause); ART. IV § 1 (full faith and
credit clause).
40. Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Mennefee, 237 U. S. 189(1915). See Walter L. Lacy Co. v. National Finance Corp., 79 S. W. (2d) 1078(Mo. App. 1935); State ex rel. Mills Automatic Merchandising Corp. v. Hogan,
103 S. W. (2d) 495 (Mo. App. 1937).
41. For a fuller discussion, see People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., 246 U. S. 79 (1918); RESTATEMENT § 167; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing
Business (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 1018; and notes (1929) 29 COL. L. Rzv. 187;(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 882; (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 327.
42. State ex rel. Nashville, C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Hall, 337 Mo. 1229, 88
S. W. (2d) 342 (1935); Detmer, Bruner & Mason v. New York Cent. R. R., 229
Mo. App. 702, 80 S. W. (2d) 222 (1935).
43. See RESTATEMENT § 92, comment b; Mo. ANNOT. § 92, comment b:
Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Cons-
merce (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 381; Note (1936) 34 MIcH. L. REv. 979.
44. 337 Mo. 1188, 88 S. W. (2d) 333 (1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 722(1935).
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in that state, and that the trial of said cause in St. Louis was an undue
burden on interstate commerce." In affirming a judgment for the plain-
tiff, the supreme court said: "It is admitted in this case that defendant
was a foreign corporation engaged in interstate transportation, and the
record shows its presence in this State transacting therein the business ordi-
narily connected with the operation of a carrier by railroad. Such a show-
ing gave the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis jurisdiction to which
defendant must submit although thereby interstate commerce might be
incidentally burdened.'I
C. Jurisdiction to Divorce
Only two recent cases involving jurisdiction to divorce have been
found." Both cases are in accord with previous Missouri decisions. Dean
James L. Parks has so thoroughly discussed this subject that further elab-
oration is useless.4 7
III. PROPERTY
A. Immovables
WQ1 of Interest in Real Property. In Cunningham v. Kinnerk,4 C,
a resident of Kentucky, was the beneficiary of a resulting trust of Missouri
land. C devised an undivided interest in the trust estate to M. C died in
1909. H, the record owner of the land, died in 1926 and the land was sold
by the executor of H. Thereafter M died and her heirs brought suit a-
gainst the executor of H to establish an equitable interest in the fund de-
rived from the sale of the land. The defendant contended that M acquired
no interest in the trust estate because, although C's will was admitted to
probate in Kentucky, it was not filed for record in the office of the recorder
of deeds in the county in which the land was situated nor probated in Mis-
souri. The defendant based his argument upon Section 552 of the Missouri
statutes. 9 A judgment for the plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal. The
45. 337 Mo. at p. 1192, 88 S. W. (2d) at pp. 333-334.
46. Coffey v. Coffey, 71 S. W. (2d) 141 (Mo. App. 1934); Barrett v. Bar-
rett, 79 S. W. (2d) 506 (Mo. App. 1935).
47. See RESTAMENT §§ 110-113; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 110-113. See also
Parks, Jurisdiction to Divorce (1927) 35 U. OF Mo. BULL. LAW SER. 3; Parks,
Some Problems in Jurisdiction to Divorce (1930) 41 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SEi. 3;
Note (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 193.
48. 230 Mo. App. 749, 74 S. W. (2d) 1107 (1934).
49. Mo. Rxv. STAT. (1929).
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1938], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol3/iss2/3
RECENT MISSOURI DECISIONS
court said: (1) that C's interest in the resulting trust of land though an
undetermined, undivided equitable interest, was nevertheless real proper-
ty ;5 (2) that the law of the place where the property is governs the valid-
ity and effect of a will of real property ;1 (3) that the force and effect
which must be given to the foreign probate of a will in so far as real prop-
ty in Missouri is concerned depends upon the law of Missouri; and that
according to the law of Missouri a foreign will, unrecorded in this state
and not proved anew (assuming it to have been executed according to
Missouri law as this one was), will have the same force and effect as an un-
recorded deed, which is good as between the parties thereto and all others
except purchasers for value without notice.52 The court found that H had
knowledge of the outstanding equitable interest of C. It was held, there-
fore, that H and her executor were bound by the terms of the will devis-
ing C's equitable interest to M; and the fact that the will was neither filed
for record nor probated in Missouri was no defense in resisting the plain-
tiffs' claims. This decision is in accord with the Restatement.5 3
Election of Widow between Dower and Proviicns of Wil. In Colvin
v. Hatchison,5" T, a resident of Illinois, died without children leaving a
will which devised Missouri land in fee to A and gave only a life estate in
Illinois lands to his wife. T's will was probated in Illinois and his widow
filed in Illinois a renunciation of the will which stated that she elected
"to take the dower and legal share in said estate." She did not file a re-
nunciation of the will in iissouri. A, the defendant, contended that the
renunciation and election in Illinois had no effect upon the title to the
Missouri land, and that it passed under the will to him. The court con-
sidered two questions. First, what was the effect upon the widow's rights
in the Missouri land of her renunciation and election in Illinois ? It was
held that a renunciation in Illinois by the widow of a testator domiciled
in Illinois, of the provisions of the husband's will in her favor, is effective
as to land in Missouri without further renunciation in Missouri. The court
points out that there is no Missouri statute providing specifically that a
widow, who is a resident of another state and who renounces a will there,
must file a renunciation also in Missouri in order to be entitled to rights
50. See RESTATEMENT §§ 208 et seq.
51. See RESTATEMENT § 249; Mo. ANNOT. § 249; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§§ 254, 549.
52. See RESTATEMENT § 470, comment e; Mo. ANNOT. § 470, comment e.
53. See notes 50, 51, 52, supra.
54. 338 Mo. 576, 92 S. W. (2d) 667 (1936).
11
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which she would have in Missouri land if no will had been made; and that
the Missouri statute, even if it may be construed to be applicable to non-
residents, does not require more than one filing of a renunciation. This
does not mean that the Illinois law controlled in any way the Missouri land,
but that the choice having been made in Illinois the widow was bound there-
by. It is within the authority of the state of the situs of the land to dis-
regard a renunciation in another state. The second question considered
by the court was, what rights in the Missouri land did the widow get? The
Illinois law, it seems, gives a widow who renounces her husband's will an
absolute interest in land rather than dower, unless dower is expressly
claimed, but the Missouri law gives dower instead of an absolute interest,
unless an absolute interest is expressly claimed. The court applied the law
of Missouri and held that the widow took dower because her declaration
filed in Illinois, while sufficient as a renunciation of the will without fur-
ther renunciation in Missouri, was not sufficient under the Missouri stat-
utes as an election to take an absolute interest instead of dower. This de-
cision is in accord with the Restatement.5
5
In Colvin v. Hutchison, it seems to have been assumed that the widow
was put to her election in both states, that is, that she was not entitled in
either state to take both under the will and the law. Whether a widow
for whom provision has been made in her husband's will in lieu of dower
is required to elect between dower and the provision under the will, is de-
termined by the law of the situs of the land. 6
IV. CONTRACTS
An eminent authority has said that the question of what law deter-
mines the validity of a contract is "the most confused subject in the field
of Conflict of Laws. Not only do rules vary in different jurisdictions but
decisions in the same court often enunciate inconsistent theories upon the
subject. ' 5 7 Several distinct rules have been laid down for determining
the nature and validity of a contract: (1) The view accepted by the Re-
statement, that the law of the place of contracting governs the validity of
the contract and the nature of the obligation."' (2) The rule that the law
55. See RESTATEMENT § 253, comments b and c.
56. See note 55, supra.
57. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 228; see 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935) § 332.1.
58. See RESTATEMENT §§ 332-347; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 332-347.
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of the place of performance governs. (3) The rule that the law intended
by the parties governs. Each of these views is supported by authority.
As was noticed in the Missoqiri Annotations,5 9 the rule commonly laid down
by the Missouri courts is that the law of the place of contracting governs
the nature and validity of a contract. Most of the cases, however, do not in-
volve square holdings on the point, for usually no different places of mak-
ing and performance appear.
A. Place of Contracting
The "place of contracting" is the place in which the last act is done
which is essential to make the promise or promises binding.6 The Su-
preme Court of Missouri has held that the "place of contracting" is to be
determined by the law of the forum." All of the recent cases involve in-
surance contracts. Insurance contracts present some difficulties due to
divergent views on what constitutes the final act necessary to complete the
contract of insurance. In general, the Missouri decisions hold that the
"place of contracting" is where the policy is delivered.6 2 But there are
such divergencies of fact in the cases that one hesitates to make wide
generalizations with reference to what constitutes such a delivery.6 3
B. Creation of Contract
Extent of Obligation: Insurance Contracts. As mentioned before, the
view accepted by the Restatement is that the law of the "place of contract-
ing" determines what are the obligations of a contract." Although the
recent Missouri decisions are in harmony with the Restatement, they do
not involve square holdings on the point, for no different places of making
and performance appear. Thus it has recently been held, no different
59. Ibid.
60. Limbaugh v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 208 (Mo. App. 1935);
see 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 311.1. For statements of place of con-
tracting in a number of situations, see RESTATEMENT §§ 311-331; Mo. ANNOT. §§
311-331.
61. Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & 0. Ry., 319 Mo. 899, 913, 8 S. W. (2d) 834,
838 (1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 640 (1934), where the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri cited the Restatement. Cf. Bolin v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 339 Mo.
618, 98 S. W. (2d) 681 (1936).
62. See notes 65-70, infra; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 317-319; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935) 317.1-319.1.
63. See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy (1919) 33 HARv.
L. REv. 198.
64. See RESTATEMENT § 346; Mo. ANNOT. § 346; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LA.ws (1935) §§ 346.1 et seq.
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place of performance appearing, that the law of the place of contracting
governs in determining whether an insurer has the right to amend its
by-laws so as to alter a contract of insurance made before the amend-
ment;65 in determining the "effective date" of a contract of insurance
for the purpose of calculating the date of lapse and beginning of the paid-
up extended insurance;6" in determining whether additional statutory
damages may be given the beneficiary for a vexatious refusal by the in-
surer to pay ;67 and in determining the effect of a total disability clause.6'
Defenses: Insurance Contracts. As usual the recent cases involve no
square holdings on the subject. No different place of performance or in-
tention of the parties appearing, the law of the place of contracting has
been held to govern in determining the materiality and effect of false
statements in an application for insurance;19 and in determining the
legality of a provision in an insurance policy denying liability of the in-




The Missouri decisions are in accord with the American view that the
substantive law of the place of the wrong governs liability for torts.7 1 If
suit is brought in Missouri for an injury suffered in State X, the law
of X determines whether or not there is a cause of action in tort.72 Whether
the law of X involves statute73 or non-statute 4 law it will be applied as
65. See Roleson v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 229
Mo. App. 772, 84 S. W. (2d) 651 (1935). In this case the insurer was an un-
incorporated association with headquarters in Ohio. The court said, "there is
no showing in the record anywhere that the law of Ohio is construed differently
from our Missouri law."
66. Evans v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 109 S. W. (2d) 380 (Mo. App.
1937).
67. O'Maley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 S. W. (2d) 852 (Mo.
App. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 585 (1936).
68. Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 229 Mo. App. 545, 80
S. W. (2d) 272 (1934) (disregarding the law stipulated for by the parties),
noted in (1936) 20 MINN. L. REV. 309.
69. Limbaugh v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 208 (Mo. App.
1935); O'Maley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 S. W. (2d) 852 (Mo.
App. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 585 (1936).
70. Wilhelm v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 104 S. W. (2d) 1042 (Mo. App.
1937) (semble). See RESTATEMENT § 347; Mo. ANNOT. § 347.
71. See RESTATEMENT §§ 377 et seq.; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 377 et seq.; 2 BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §§ 377.1 et seq.
72. See Mo. ANNOT. §§ 379, 380.
73. See notes, 84-87, infra.
74. See note 75, infra.
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understood and interpreted by the courts of X. Thus the liability-creat-
ing character of the defendant's conduct in failing to keep a lookout for
trespassers upon railroad tracks, 7 in "kicking" railroad cars across a
grade crossing,7" in racing on a highway,77 in failing to keep to the right
side of a highway,78 in failing to utilize a last chance, 7" has recently been
held to depend on the law of the place of the wrong. Even if an injury
suffered in Missouri, the forum, would involve tort liability, relief for a
similar injury suffered in X, where the injury occurred, cannot be granted
if no right of action was created by the law of X.80 Conversely, if the law
of X created a right of action in tort, this right will be recognized and
enforced in Missouri,81 regardless of the internal law of the forum.2
If the law of X requires the plaintiff to prove "wilful" or "wanton"
conduct on the part of the defendant in order to recover, the courts of
Missouri will not hold the defendant liable for less unreasonable conduct,
regardless of the Missouri rule in cases where the injury occurred there8
Thus in McCarty v. Bishop, 4 while the plaintiff was riding as a guest of
the defendant in her automobile, an accident occurred in Illinois. Suit
was brought in Missouri. The Illinois "guest" statute limited recovery
by a guest to cases where the driver was guilty of "wilful and wanton"
conduct. The Missouri court applied the Illinois statute as interpreted
by the courts of that state. On the other hand, if certain conduct in State
X is negligent per se by the law of X, it will be so held by the courts of
75. Smith v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 95, 85 S. W. (2d)
425 (1935); Saba v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 337 Mo. 105, 85 . W. (2d) 429 (1935).
76. Haton v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 335 Mo. 1186, 76 S. W. (2d) 127 (1934).
77. McCarty v. Bishop, 102 S. W. (2d) 126 (Mo. App. 1937) (responsibility
of a driver of a car to a guest). See note 84, infra.
78. Hall v. Wilkerson, 84 S. W. (2d) 1063 (Mo. App. 1935) (responsibility
of a driver of a car to a guest). See note 84, infra.
79. Cramer v. Parker, 100 S. W. (2d) 640 (Mo. App. 1937).
80. Saba v. Illinois Cent. R. R., supra note 75; see RESTATEMENT § 384 (2);
Mo. ANNOT. § 384 (2).
81. See notes 77, 78, 79, supra; note 86, infra; RESTATEMENT § 384 (1);
Mo. ANNOT. § 384 (1).
82. In Chandler v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 127 Mo. App. 34, 43, 106 S. W.
553, 556 (1907), the court said: "His cause of action must be measured, not
by our own standards, but by that fixed by the rules and principles recognized
by the courts of the place where he was injured."
83. Robertson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 105 S. W. (2d) 996 (Mo. App.
1937) ; cases cited in note 75, supra.
84. 102 S. W. (2d) 126 (Mo. App. 1937), Accord, Hall v. Wilkerson, 84
S. W. (2d) 1063 (Mo. App. 1935) (Iowa "guest" statute, limiting recovery
by a guest to cases where the driver was guilty of "reckless" conduct, i. e. "a
heedless disregard for or indifference to the rights of others"). For a discussion
of some of the interesting conflict of laws problems which have arisen in con-
nection with these "guest" statutes, see Note (1937) 36 MicH. L. REv. 268.
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Missouri, whatever may be the Missouri rule in such cases. This is true
whether the conduct in question is that of the plaintiff85 or of the defend-
ant. 6
The effect of the plaintiff's own conduct upon his recovery also depends
upon the law of the place of the wrong. If the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff is a complete defense by the law of State X, the place of
the wrong, no action can be sustained in Missouri, though by the law of
Missouri an action would lie. On the other hand, if in State X, contribu-
tory negligence is a defense only in certain cases but not in the case at
bar, it is not a defense in a suit in Missouri. And if the doctrine of com-
parative negligence prevails in X, it will be enforced in Missouri."'
The Restatement holds that the law of the place of wrong governs
liability for torts. As mentioned before, the Missouri decisions are in
harmony with this rule."9 It is to be noted, however, that in all of the
Missouri cases the person charged with having caused an injury acted in
the state in which the injury occurred. Consequently the court was not
required to choose between the law of the state of the actor's conduct and
that of the state in which the consequences of the actor's conduct mani-
fested themselves.90
B. Actions for Wrongful Death91
A few recent cases involve actions for wrongful death. Missouri fol-
lows the rule that the nature and existence of a right of action for wrong-
ful death depends upon the law of the place where the injury resulting
85. Grimes v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 106 S. W. (2d) 462 (Mo. 1937);
Weeks v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 109 S. W. (2d) 374 (Mo. App. 1937); Hill v.
Illinois Terminal Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 40 (Mo. App. 1937). See Harting v.
East St. Louis Ry., 81 S. W. (2d) 973 (Mo. App. 1935).
86. Loveless v. Berberich Delivery Co., 335 Mo. 650, 73 S. W. (2d) 790
(1934); Corbett v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 336 Mo. 972, 82 S. W. (2d)
97 (1935); Cotton v. Ship-By-Truck Co., 337 Mo. 270, 85 S. W. (2d) 80 (1935).
87. Connole v. East St. Louis & S. Ry., 102 S. W. (2d) 581 (Mo. 1937);
Grimes v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 106 S. W. (2d) 462 (Mo. 1937); Harting
v. East St. Louis Ry., 81 S. W. (2d) 973 (Mo. App. 1935); Hill v. Illinois
Terminal Co., 100 S. W. (2d) 40 (Mo. App. 1937); Weeks v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry., 109 S. W. (2d) 374 (Mo. App. 1937); see RESTATEYnNT § 385; Mo.
ANNOT. § 385.
88. Barnes v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 338 Mo. 497, 92 S. W. (2d)
164 (1936).
89. See note 71, supra.
90. See Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 47 L. Q.
REv. 483; Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. RBEV.
202.
91. For a discussion of this subject see Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Ac-
tions For Wrongful Death (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 545.
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in death occursY- If, therefore, no right of action exists by the law of
State X, the place of the fatal injury, there can be no recovery in Mis-
souri." On the other hand, if a statute of the place of injury gives a right
of action for death, an action for the death of the person will be allowed
in Missouri.94  But if the plaintiff fails to plead the foreign statute there
can be no recovery in Missouri 5
VI. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 98
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act provides:
"This chapter shall apply to all injuries received in this state,
regardless of where the contract of employment was made, and also
to all injuries received outside of this state under contract of em-
ployment made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any
case shall otherwise provide.' '97
A. Compensation under Act of State of Employment
Even in the absence of an express statutory provision on the subject,
the view taken by most courts is that there can be recovery under the
act of the state in which the contract of employment was made though
the injury occurs in another state. 8 The Missouri Act provides in specific
words that it shall apply in such a case unless the contract of employment
shall otherwise provide. In Bolin v. Swift & Co.,9' the employer was an
92. See Mo. ANNOT. § 391.
93. Connole v. East St. Louis & S. Ry., 102 S. W. (2d) 581 (Mo. 1937);
Smith v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 228 Mo. App. 600, 71 S. W. (2d) 842 (1934),
s. c. 104 S. W. (2d) 1050 (1937). See Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 46
S. W. (2d) 591 (1932), cited note 95, infra.
94. Fox v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 335 Mo. 984, 74 S. W. (2d) 608 (1934); see
Mo. ANNOT. § 392. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 705, 706.
95. Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S. W. (2d) 591 (1932).
96. Numerous articles dealing with conflict of laws questions arising out
of the application of Workmen's Compensation Acts are available: Dunlap,
The Conflict of Laws and Workmen's Compensation (1935) 23 CAL. L. REV. 381;
Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws (1927) 11 MINN. L.
Rav. 329; Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 20
MINN. L. REv. 19; Angell, Recovery under Workmen's Compensation Acts for
Injury Abroad (1918) 31 HARV. L. Rnv. 619. See Note (1934) 90 A. L. R. 119.
97. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 3310, subsection (b).
98. 2 BEAT , CONFLICT o1 LAws (1935) § 398.2. Of course an employee
cannot recover for harm sustained in another state under the act of the state
in which the contract of employment was made if the statute provides in specific
words that it is applicable only when harm occurs within the state. Se RESTATE-
MENT, § 399, comment b.
99. 335 Mo. 732, 73 S. W. (2d) 774 (1934). Accord, Toon v. David G. Evans
Coffee Co., 103 S. W. (2d) 533 (Mo. App. 1937) (contract of employment made
in Missouri; employee killed in Kentucky; Missouri Act applied on basis of
express provision).
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Illinois corporation with branch plants in St. Joseph, Missouri, and Center-
ville, Iowa. B was employed by the corporation at St. Joseph, as a travel-
ling salesman in December, 1923. In the latter part of December, 1923,
B went to Centerville, which was centrally located in the territory he was
to travel over, and continuously lived there until his death in 1932. His
territory was partly in Iowa and partly in Missouri. B was fatally in-
jured in Centerville while acting in the course of his employment. His
widow claimed compensation under the Missouri Act. The employer and
its insurer contended that the Missouri Act did not apply because B was a
resident of Iowa and that claimant's rights could only be those provided
by the Iowa Compensation Law. It was also contended that the Missouri
Act did not apply because it was not in effect at the time the contract of
employment was made. The supreme court held that the claimant was
entitled to compensation under the Missouri Act. It was pointed out that
there is nothing in the act which limits its application to employees who
are residents of Missouri. The court emphasized the fact that the em-
ployer was a "major employer" in Missouri. As to the contention that
the local act did not apply because it was not in effect at the time the con-
tract of employment was made, the court said that when the act was
adopted and accepted, both by the employer and the employee, their con-
tract was thus modified and changed, and the act immediately became a
part of the contract. It is to be noted that the court used the "major
employer" theory as well as the "contract" theory to support the applica-
tion of express provisions of the Missouri Act.100 The decision is in ac-
cord with the Restatement." 1
B. Compensation under Act of State of Injury
In State ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation
Comm., 0 2 one Weaver was a resident of Missouri at the time of his death,
employed by a New York corporation as a travelling salesman. The con-
tract of employment was made in Illinois. Weaver worked in Missouri
and sustained fatal injuries in this state in the course of his employment.
He was survived by his widow, also a resident of Missouri, and two minor
children. The widow applied to the Missouri Workmen's Compensation
100. The "contract" theory has been severely criticised. See articles cited
in note 96, supra.
101. See RESTATEMENT § 398; Mo. ANNOT. § 398.
102. 339 Mo. 150, 95 S. W. (2d) 641 (1936).
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Commission for compensation under the Missouri Act. The Illinois Act' 3
provided that it should apply to any injury received outside the state
of Illinois, under contract of employment made within that state. The
Missouri Act provided that it should apply to all injuries received in
Missouri, regardless of where the contract of employment was made, un-
less the contract of employment provided otherwise. The contract of em-
ployment was silent as to what law should apply. Each act provided that
its remedy should be exclusive. The supreme court held that the Missouri
Act governed because the interest of the state of Missouri was superior
to that of Illinois. The court considered the employee's Missouri domicil,
plus the possibility of the widow becoming a public charge, sufficient
to uphold recovery under the Missouri Act. In so deciding, the court
referred to one case only-Alaska Packer's Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm. of California. 0 4 In this case the Supreme Court of the United
States said that a conflict arising between the workmen's compensation
laws of two states "is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the
full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to sub-
ordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the gov-
ernmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of de-
cision according to their weight."'' 0 5 Although the Restatement does not
recognize the "superior governmental interest" theory, the decision in the
Weaver case is in harmony with the rule adopted by the Restatement.'"
C. Neither Employment nor Injury in State
Adams v. Continental Life Ins. Co.10 7 followed the usual rule that no
recovery can be had under the Workmen's Compensation Act of a state
if neither the injury occurred nor the contract of employment was made
in the state. In this case, A, from February 1, 1924, to October, 1931, was
in the employ of the insurance company in South Dakota. In 1931, A was
transferred to the home office in Missouri, and consented in Missouri to
103. ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd) § 142, c. 48; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill,
1933).
104. 294 U. S. 532 (1935).
105. 294 U. S. at 547.
106. See RESTATEMENT §§ 399, 402. The Restatement was published in
1934; the Alaska Packers case was decided in 1935. Cf. Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932), Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 291; Joseph
I. Weiderhoff v. Neal, 6 F. Supp. 798 (D. C. Mo. 1934); RESTATEMENT § 401;
Mo. ANNOT. § 401.
107. 101 S. W. (2d) 75 (Mo. 1936).
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take on new duties relating primarily to taxes on the company's invest-
ments in 33 states. His salary was included in the Missouri pay roll and
the company's compensation policy was amended to eliminate coverage
under the South Dakota Compensation Act. In 1932 he was sent back
to South Dakota to perform certain services for the employer with in-
structions to return to Missouri when these services were finished. A was
fatally injured in South Dakota. Claim was filed before the Missouri
Commission on the ground that deceased was working under a contract
entered into in Missouri. Compensation was denied, the commission find-
ing that the evidence was insufficient to show that a contract was made
in Missouri when the deceased was called to the home office in 1931. The
ruling of the commission was upheld by the supreme court. This decision
is in accord with the Restatement.10 8
D. Effect of Admiralty Jtrisdi tion
In the Restatement it is stated that if the case is one which is within
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction, the remedy under a State Workmen's
Compensation Act cannot be constitutionally allowed in any state of the
United States.10 9 The Missouri cases are in accord.10
VII. JUDGMENTS
A. Recognition of a Foreign Judgment
A recent case"' holds that in a suit on a judgment of another state
the defendant may plead and show that in the original suit no service was
had upon him" 2 and that his appearance entered by an attorney was un-
authorized.""
108. See RESTATEMENT § 400.
109. See RESTATEMENT § 401, comment c.
110. See McClain v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 S. W. (2d) 132 (Mo. App.
1935), appeal dismissed, 338 Mo. 7, 88 S. W. (2d) 1019 (1935); State ex rel.
Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Comm., 92 S. W.(2d) 624 (Mo. 1936), s. c. 81 S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo. App. 1935).
111. Topalian Bros. v. Asadorian, 104 S. W. (2d) 713 (Mo. App. 1937).
112. See RESTATEMENT §§ 77, 429-430; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 77, 429-430; 1
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) § 74.7; Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of
Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 552, 560-62.
113. See RESTATEMENT § 82, comment e; Mo. ANNOT. § 82, comment e; 1
BEA E, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 74.6; Note (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 148; Note
(1934) 88 A. L. R. 12.
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In Renchow v. Bankers Life Co.,11 the plaintiff, claiming that the de-
fendant had violated its contract of insurance, sued at law to recover as-
sessments he had paid the defendant. The defendant, an Iowa assessment
insurance company, pleaded as res judicata a judgment of the courts of
Iowa in an action where other members of the defendant corporation had
brought suits in equity on behalf of themselves and other members similar-
ly situated, to determine the right of the defendant to levy such assess-
ments upon members of the class to which the plaintiff belonged. The
plaintiff was not a party to the Iowa suit and did not appear therein. It
was held that the decision in the Iowa suit brought by members of a class
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated was binding on the
plaintiff as a member of such class and that the courts of Missouri must
give full faith and credit to the Iowa judgment and decision. This case
is in accord with the Restatement."5
VIII. ADMINISTRATION Op ESTATES
A. Administration of Decedents' Estates
Extraterritoriat Effect of Judgments against Administrators.1 6 In
general, an administrator cannot be sued in either a state or federal court
of a state other than the state of his appointment on a claim against the
decedent. It is immaterial that the action was begun during the decedent's
lifetime and that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the de-
cedent.1 7 The prevailing view is that even the voluntary appearance of a
foreign administrator does not confer jurisdiction upon a court to render
a judgment on a claim against the estate."" In a few cases, however, judg-
ment has been rendered against a foreign administrator on a claim against
the estate when the administrator had "waived" his immuity either by
bringing an action himself or by failing to set up his immunity as a de-
fen,'. However, a judgment rendered under such circumstances will not
114. 335 Mo. 668, 73 S. W. (2d) 794 (1934).
115. See RESTATEMENT §§ 185, 186, 450, comment d; Mo. ANNOT. §§ 185,
186, 450, comment d.
116. In the Restatement of this subject, the word "administrator" is used
to include an executor, unless specifically stated otherwise.
117. See RESTATEMENT § 512; Mo. ANNOT. § 512; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1935) 512.1.
118. See RESTATEMENT § 513; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) §§ 513.1,
514.1.
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be recognized as a valid claim against the estate in the state where the ad-
ministrator was appointed, or in any other state. It was so held in a recent
Missouri case where the judgment was rendered in an admiralty suit in
a federal court of Louisiana against an administrator appointed in Mis-
souri.""' The court assumed that the Missouri administrator had entered
an appearance in the Louisiana action but refused to recognize the judg-
ment as a valid claim against the estate in Missouri, since this would be to
allow a foreign court to determine the disposition of property in Missouri.
This decision is in accord with the Restatement.
There is no privity between representatives that will make a judg-
ment against one binding against the other, even where they are the same
individual, subject to the case where the same person is executor in two
states. 120 In Carpenter v. Strange,12' the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a judgment against an executor in one state is entitled
to full faith and credit in a suit against an executor in another state, if
the executor is the same individual. This decision, however, has been
limited by a later decision of the Supreme Court. 2 And in First National
Bank v. Blessing, 2 3 a Missouri court permitted a creditor of the estate to
prove on the original claim against the domiciliary executrix though he
had recovered a judgment on the same claim in ancillary proceedings in
Colorado against a different representative appointed in that state. After
pointing out that the record did not show whether the Colorado representa-
tive was appointed administratrix or executrix, the court said: "It is,
however, unimportant, so far as the issues of the case are concerned,
whether she was appointed administratrix or executrix." This decision is
in accord with the Restatement.124
IX. PROCEDURE
A. Foreign Law
A statute requires the Missouri courts to take judicial notice of the
public statutes and judicial decisions of a sister state when the law of
119. In re Estate of Thompson v. Coyle and Co., 339 Mo. 410, 97 S. W. (2d)
93 (1936).
120. See RESTATEMENT § 510; Mo. ANNOT. § 510.
121. 141 U. S. 87 (1891).
122. Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U. S. 82 (1908), holding that a judg-
ment establishing a claim against an ancillary administrator c. t. a. is not bind-
ing on the executor in the domiciliary administration.
123. 98 S. W. (2d) 149 (Mo. App. 1936).
124. See note 120, supra.
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the other state is pleaded.12 5 This statute does not authorize the courts to
take judicial notice of the law of another state unless it is pleaded.' s But
if a statute of another state is pleaded the courts will take judicial notice,
not only of the statute itself, but also of the interpretation placed upon the
statute by the courts of the state in which it was enacted. 2 ' In Corbett v.
Terminal Railroad Ass'v,2 it was held that the pleading was sufficient to
require the court to take judicial notice of the Illinois statute creating the
Illinois Commerce Commission and giving it exclusive power to regulate
the operation of crossing gates at grade crossings, but that the court could
not take judicial notice of the commission's order relating to crossing
gates, where such order was not pleaded nor called to the attention of the
trial court.
125. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 806.
126. See Mo. ANNOT. § 621. Cf. Connole v. Floyd Plant Food Co., 96 S. W.
(2d) 655 (Mo. App. 1936).
127. Barnes v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 338 Mo. 497, 92 S. W. (2d)
164 (1936).
128. 336 Mo. 972, 82 S. W. (2d) 97 (1935).
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